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Lessons from the Anticanon (and Some Comparative Questions)
Jamal Greene†
American constitutional interpretive discourse is fixated on an “anticanon”
of cases that has remained stable over the last four decades or so: Dred Scott v.
Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner v. New York, and (arguably) Korematsu v.
United States.1 American constitutional interpretive discourse also includes
references to a set of episodes not captured in domestic case law that qualify as
what Kim Lane Scheppele has called “aversive” models.2 We craft and develop
constitutional norms in opposition to expressive immoral or dysfunctional legal
and political history with cultural salience: the colonial experience under the
Crown and the subsequent experience under confederation; the controversy over
the Alien and Sedition Acts; the Red Scare and 1950s McCarthyism; Watergate;
and so forth. For a time, Reconstruction was also on this unfortunate list. Some,
though not many, of these aversive episodes are in no sense a part of the domestic
political history of the United States: the practices of Nazi Germany, Soviet
Russia, and apartheid-era South Africa.3
Anticanonical cases serve much the same function as anticanonical
episodes, and the same basic features of such episodes also serve to recommend
cases for anticanonical treatment. Thus, American constitutional interpretive
discourse, no less than ordinary political discourse or indeed Internet blogging,
features what Leo Strauss called the reductio ad Hitlerum, whereby “[a] view is . .
. refuted by the fact that it happens to have been shared by Hitler.”4 Nazi
Germany so frequently appears in these discourses not because it stands for any
particular proposition but because its moral valence and the pluripotency of its
message permits it to stand for every particular proposition. In extremis,
democracy and totalitarianism, moral relativism and moral certainty all lead to
Hitler. Likewise, constitutional interpretivism and noninterpretivism both lead to
Dred Scott; formalism and contextualization both lead to Plessy; judicial
curtailment of the regulatory state and judicial invocation of substantive due
process both lead to Lochner.
I note the peculiar use of anticanonical cases and their affinity with
aversive constitutionalism more generally in order to gesture, schmooze-like, at
an important distinction in the ways in which judicial precedent is used in
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constitutional argument. The distinction has implications for the debate, such as it
is, over the uses of transnational comparative materials in constitutional law.
Constitutional theory increasingly adopts a distinction, first developed by Keith
Whittington, between constitutional interpretation and constitutional
construction.5 Constitutional interpretation might be understood in one of two
ways (depending on the scholar), either as exegesis of constitutional text or as the
process by which one arrives at the semantic content of the law. Thus, Bruce
Ackerman’s multi-generational synthesis of constitutional moments might well be
understood, on his terms, as an exercise in interpretation even if it is unconcerned
with constitutional text. The important point is that interpretation is directed at
constitutional meaning rather than constitutional adjudication.6 By contrast,
constitutional construction involves the building out of constitutional reality over
time as underspecified constitutional standards and principles are made flesh
through lived experience. Theorists will disagree on the degree to which
constitutional construction is in fact or should ideally be constrained by
constitutional interpretation, but construction is, in any event, not limited to the
materials that speak to constitutional meaning. Constitutional construction brings
constitutional meaning, narrowly understood, together with other sources of
adjudicative wisdom to arrive at an appropriate resolution to concrete cases.
Adopting this distinction for present purposes (without committing to it for all
time), constitutional interpretation is primarily a dialectic process whereas
constitutional construction is primarily a rhetorical process. In Aristotelian terms,
rhetoric involves not just logos but also pathos and ethos; it involves the creative
use of narrative and it involves appeals to the basic and particularistic character of
a political community.
Let us return, then, to the use of judicial precedent in constitutional cases.
We can understand relying on such precedent in the service of either
interpretation or construction. We might believe that the meaning of a particular
constitutional provision in some sense includes the authoritative applications and
qualifications developed over time through case law. Thus, constitutional
interpretation will involve deciphering the semantic intentions underlying judicial
opinions as “constitutional” texts. The debate over whether a particular part of a
Supreme Court opinion is holding or dicta is intelligible in the context of
understanding the body of decisional law articulated in such opinions as, in effect,
a dictionary that explains the meanings of words in the Constitution. We might
alternatively view judicial opinions externally, as part of the cultural and
historical mosaic that “constitutes” a people over time and therefore is an
important source of wisdom in any political decisional process. Constitutional
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construction might entail reference to such opinions as part of an appeal not to
legal meaning as such but to pathos or to ethos, as an argument from ethical
authority for why some proposition, perhaps itself arrived at through
interpretation, should or should not govern present legal and political affairs.
Resort to judicial precedent, like appeals to history, might in this sense be termed
a form of ethical argument.7
Anticanonical cases are used primarily in this second way; we
misunderstand them if we believe they are used only or primarily in the first way.
These cases are cited in proportion to their repudiation within the political culture
not because they are necessary to rebut some statement of what “the law” is or
requires but because use of precedent as pathos or ethos is much more likely to
rely upon an efficient and expressive jargon than is use of precedent as a
statement of legal meaning. We cite Lochner rather than Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
Coppage v. Kansas, or Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (the case the switch-in-time
actually repudiated) for the same reason we cite Nazi Germany rather than the
Khmer Rouge or the Partition of India: not just (or even, I think, primarily)
because of the scale of atrocity, and certainly not because more modern
phenomena approximate the Holocaust than other genocides, but rather because
the domains in which we discuss such matters neither require nor invite nuance.
The point is to assimilate ones opponent to a shared negative reference; the
effectiveness of this style of argument increases in proportion to the notoriety and
expressive capacity of the reference and diminishes in proportion to its obscurity.
Which brings us to comparative constitutional law. Consider the sources
of American resistance to reference to foreign precedent within domestic
constitutional discourse.8 There are two broad categories of criticism. First, it is
argued that drawing on foreign law exacerbates the countermajoritarian difficulty
by permitting American constitutional law to take direction from legal norms that
do not reflect our demos. Second, the universe of sources of foreign law is so vast
that it is difficult or impossible, even in good faith, to select references
intelligently and, a fortiori, to reign in bad-faith selective citation. Both categories
of criticism generally assume, however, that a judge is using foreign precedents as
an aid to constitutional interpretation rather than constitutional construction. In
constitutional construction, the purpose of the reference is often precisely to
identify the domestic ethos. If it is a negative reference, the fact that it emerges
from a different jurisdiction or culture is therefore an argument in favor of its use.
And the second category of criticism, based on problems of selectivity, assumes a
dialectic rather than a rhetorical mode of argumentation. As discussed, selectivity
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is a feature of rhetoric, not a flaw. Scholars have noted that using foreign
precedents as negative models mitigates many of the criticisms associated with
the use of such precedent more generally.9 Indeed, even critics of foreign citation
themselves use foreign precedent in this way. Studying the domestic anticanon
underscores the fact that we often use domestic precedent, including case law, in
much the same way.
This observation raises a number of questions, however, that require both
more thinking and more substantive knowledge (on my part) even to begin to
answer. First, we might wish to explore what rhetorical use of negative case law
within the domestic setting tells us about similar use of positive case law, and
therefore whether the interpretation-construction distinction (as I have framed it)
can offer an answer to critics of foreign citation even outside the context of
negative citation. Exploring the ways in which we use anticanonical cases in the
domestic context makes it obvious that we often use canonical cases in much the
same way. The rhetorical use of canonical cases can be obscured by the fact that
such cases are also good law, and are therefore essential to the practice of
interpretation. For example, deciphering the “meaning” of Brown in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 110 was both an
exercise in interpretation, because everyone understood the legal meaning of
Brown in part to control the case, and in construction, because Brown is a cultural
icon whose authority is a significant resource in constitutional argument quite
apart from whether the decision is formally controlling.
I can identify no reason, in principle, why a foreign decisional precedent
that also happens to be good law cannot aid in construction even if it is irrelevant
or barely relevant to interpretation. Indeed, I believe this is precisely how such
precedents are often used, but (as with Brown) it can be difficult to disaggregate
the distinct uses. Consider the use of Dudgeon v. United Kingdom and other
foreign case law in Lawrence v. Texas.11 Justice Kennedy wrote:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it
should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been
rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has followed
not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v United Kingdom. Other
nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
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conduct. The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been
no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.12
Dudgeon is good law, and its example is meant to support, not to attack the
proposition for which it is cited. It is easy, then, to characterize the citation as
evidence of the evolving meaning of the term “liberty” in the Fourteenth
Amendment. That is certainly how Justice Scalia read the reference:
Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some
States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior.
Much less do they spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe,
because foreign nations decriminalize conduct. The Bowers majority
opinion never relied on “values we share with a wider civilization”, but
rather rejected the claimed right to sodomy on the ground that such a right
was not “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’”. Bowers’
rational-basis holding is likewise devoid of any reliance on the views of a
“wider civilization”. The Court’s discussion of these foreign views
(ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained criminal
prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta,
however, since “this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans.”13
Consider, however, the possibility that reference to “wider civilization” and
“human freedom” is not directed at the meaning of liberty, per se, but with the
independent question of why a meaning of liberty arrived at through other means
and leading to a valid constitutional claim in this case should be deemed
controlling notwithstanding precedent, Burkean prudence, or other sources of
adjudicative guidance. To say that a contrary holding is uncivilized is an appeal to
pathos. To say that “in this country” the government has no more urgent interest
in curtailing personal choice is an appeal to ethos.
Consider, in this regard, the Court’s erstwhile practice, memorably
mocked by John Hart Ely, of referring to “the traditions of the English-speaking
people.”14 This practice makes much more sense in the context of construction
than interpretation. As Will Kymlicka writes, democratic political traditions
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emerge from “politics in the vernacular,”15 based on the fact that “political
communication has a large ritualistic component, and these ritualized forms of
communication are typically language-specific.”16 It might be quite difficult in a
case involving positive citation to distinguish exercises in interpretation from
exercises in construction, but this problem is not special to the use of foreign
precedent. The point, rather, is that the assumption that all such references speak
to interpretation alone is no more warranted in this context than it would be with
respect to domestic precedent.
Thus understood, the two overarching criticisms of foreign citation in U.S.
courts—reliance on non-autochthonous sources of legal norms and the problems
of identification and citation—again fade away as persuasive criticisms. Citation
to foreign precedent as an element of construction is itself part of an argumentive
practice directed at resolving the degree to which a particular proposition forms
part of our traditions. To criticize it on the basis of its reference to foreign
precedent as not distinctively American assumes the answer to the question
presented. From this perspective, the cherry-picking criticism seems especially
perverse, since it is manifestly not the case, nor would anyone argue, that any and
every foreign precedent that is legally on point also coheres with American
values. We do not use Iranian law as positive precedent because the practices of
Iran do not wield authority in constitutional argument, and choosing among
competing sources of authority is precisely the ballgame.
A second major question arises from this discussion, and this one is far
more difficult to answer. I have sought guidance from the use of anticanonical
cases to derive both a justification for citation to foreign precedent and, in broad
terms, a set of criteria that might guide the practice of citation to such precedents.
The discussion has been limited, however, to U.S. courts. The anticanon serves a
particular set of functions within American constitutional discourse. One of its
most significant functions is to mitigate severe dissonance between the
Constitution’s drafting and ratification and our current time. Abrupt ethical shifts
that in retrospect are either morally or practically requisite are explained in terms
of wrongheaded judicial decisions rather than constitutional error or disjunction.
Thus, protection of slavery is rendered a consequence rather than a cause of Dred
Scott; a political and constitutional commitment to (or tolerance of) Jim Crow is
rendered a consequence rather than a cause of Plessy; and hindrance of the
regulatory state is rendered a consequence of Lochner rather than integral to the
free labor ideology of Reconstruction and the politics of the Lochner era. The
U.S. Constitution is both famously old and famously difficult to amend, and so
some means of mitigating the dissonance between the eighteenth century and
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today is necessary in order to make the original Constitution feel, in any palpable
sense, ours.17 The anticanon is an instrument of cognitive dissonance.
A polity with a more modern constitution and with an easier amendment
process might have less need to treat judicial opinions interpreting their
constitution in the way in which we treat our anticanon. If other nations do not
have anticanons, or do not include case law within them, or do not in any event
use anticanonical cases or episodes in the same way, any lessons for foreign
citation derived from the way in which Americans use the anticanon might be
only imperfectly applied to other jurisdictions. We will want to know, then, how
anticanons are identified and used in other countries. It makes sense to ask those
questions, moreover, about two different species of anticanon: the domestic
anticanon and the transnational anticanon. The domestic anticanon is the set of
intrajurisdictional cases or episodes treated as irredeemably wrong across the
political spectrum within a given polity; the transnational anticanon is the set of
cases or episodes that are treated as irredeemably wrong across a range of
different jurisdictions.
It is clear that some countries besides the United States have their own set
of intrajurisdictional episodes and cases that are cited aversively. Scheppele’s
article sought to identify and describe just this phenomenon across several
different jurisdictions, but her study focused primarily on aversive citation in
constitutional design rather than constitutional interpretation. If one of the
primary functions of anticanonical argument in U.S. discourse is to mitigate the
effects of time on constitutional interpretation, then use of such argument in
constitutional design obviously serves a different purpose. It is, likewise, less
likely that an aversive model in constitutional design will take the form of a
judicial decision rather than a comprehensive political regime, and so it is difficult
to perceive lessons in the practice for citation to foreign judicial precedent.
Determining the transnational prevalence of aversive citation to judicial
opinions in aid of constitutional interpretation requires far more expertise than I
can claim. The foreign jurisdictions with which I am most familiar—Canada and
Australia—do not, it seems to me, have cases within their respective domestic
canons that approximate the role Dred Scott or Lochner plays in the United States.
I am also not aware of any such cases within French or German jurisprudence,
though I concede significant ignorance of the case law of the Conseil
Constitutionnel and the German Constitutional Court. This is hardly an exhaustive
survey, and my level of confidence is low even as to these few jurisdictions, but if
my impression is correct, it does suggest that the United States—where
anticanonical discourse is vibrant—might have some unique features that lend
themselves peculiarly to this form of argument. The absence of any significant
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strain of originalism in most of these other jurisdictions—with Australia as a
qualified exception—might, in part, be either cause or effect of the American
fixation on anticanonical cases. Further study is needed to say more.
One apparent and significant example of an anticanonical case within a
foreign jurisdiction is Jabalpur v. Shukla in India. The case involved the
suspension of habeas corpus during a state of emergency declared by Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. The unavailability of habeas was in apparent
contravention of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which provides that “no
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.” Nonetheless, the Court held that Article 21 had no
effect during a state of emergency. Pratap Bhanu Mehta has said that the decision
“is now unanimously regarded as one of the worst in Indian judicial history.”18 As
with Dred Scott, Jabalpur v. Shukla was quickly overturned by constitutional
amendment, but only after Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party allies were
forced from power. The rights-activism of the Supreme Court of India is often
tied to Maneka Gadhi v. Union of India, the court decision that decisively
repudiated the legalism evident in the Shukla decision. Like the United States,
India is a common law jurisdiction but it has a comparatively young constitution
that is unusually easy to amend. It might be that constitutional age and rigidity do
not in themselves give rise to anticanons but only make it more likely that a
constitutional crisis will ensue which nominally is resolved within the existing
constitutional framework. The anticanonical case then underwrites a narrative of
constitutional continuity.
The second species of anticanon, the “transnational” anticanon, has not
been the subject of much study, at least as to cases, and it is not obvious that such
a phenomenon is especially prevalent. Reference to negative examples from
foreign jurisdictions is of course a significant part of constitutional discourse both
in the United States and abroad.19 But we might distinguish between mere
negative examples and, to cite Scheppele again, “aversive” examples, which
connote models “that are so forcefully rejected that they cast their influence over
the whole constitution-building effort.”20 Scheppele says that such episodes can
be foreign,21 but again, her focus is on constitution drafting rather than
constitutional interpretation, and her focus is on historical episodes or tropes
rather than cases. In order for a judicial precedent to serve as a transnational
aversive model, the precedent itself must have an unambiguous moral or ethical
valence across a range of jurisdictions, it must be sufficiently well-known that it
may serve a rhetorical purpose, facilitating efficient discourse about constitutional
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commitments, and the judiciary must figure prominently in large-scale
constitutional change within the referring jurisdiction.
Sujit Choudhry has suggested that Lochner has served this function within
a number of jurisdictions, including Canada, South Africa, and Israel.22 In
Canada, Lochner was invoked during the Charter drafting process to explain the
wording of section 7 of the Charter, which provides: “Everyone has the right to
life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Avoiding the
words “property” and “due process of law,” which appear in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, was defended by reference to
the unfortunate consequences of the Lochner era. Lochner has also figured
prominently in subsequent interpretation of section 7, both by litigants and judges
seeking to limit its reach. It is not surprising that Lochner would be anticanonical
within Canada. Not only was Lochner specifically cited during the Charter’s
drafting, but the Supreme Court of Canada refers liberally to foreign precedent;
U.S. jurisprudence in particular looms large over its neighbor (much of whose
elite bar received some legal training in the United States); and Canada had its
own New Deal crisis contemporaneous with the crisis that led to Lochner’s formal
repudiation in the United States. Choudhry cites but does not elaborate on
references to Lochner in South African and Israeli opinions.
Further study is necessary to flesh out how transnational anticanonical
cases are actually used in other jurisdictions. Questions for a possible research
agenda in this direction include not only whether the phenomenon exists and what
its content might be but how and through whose agency cases make their way into
the anticanon, whether and to what degree the narrative accompanying such cases
varies across jurisdictions with distinct cultures and distinct legal and political
histories, and indeed whether the use of cases in foreign jurisdictions can
meaningfully be described in terms of the interpretation-construction distinction
as I have described it. Contrary to the standard criticism of foreign law citation,
greater variation in the narratives that attach to aversively cited foreign precedent
may signal not misunderstanding or pernicious manipulation of such sources but
rather domestication of a global resource to suit local legal and political
dynamics. Indeed, the greater fear is that such cases are treated as if they have
only a single message or some particularized legal significance, which would be
inconsistent with their use within their native jurisdictions and which would
impoverish their potential as rhetorical points of reference.
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